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INTRODUCTION

T

HIS article considers extending labor law to the ultimate
small business: the independent contractor with no
employees.
Labor and employment law apply to the employment relation. The scope of labor and employment law therefore is limited
by the scope of those legal relations classified as "employment."
All major federal labor and employment statutes explicitly define
"employee," "employer" or both.' Such definitions frequently
exclude small employers, giving rise to the subject of this symposium. But there is another more profound limitation of the definitions that this article seeks to explore.
The most profound limitation of the scope of labor and employment law is that some kinds of agency are classified as "independent contractor" rather than employment relationships.
Independent contractors sometimes are enterprises with their
own employees. But sometimes independent contractors are individuals. Individual independent contractors may perform nursing services in hospitals alongside nurses considered to be
employees. They may perform office clerical services alongside
persons defined as employees. 2 Individual independent contrac1. See infra notes 122-68 and accompanying text.
2. See Boston After Dark, Inc. & United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 210
N.L.R.B. 38, 43-44 (1974) (concluding that freelance newspaper writers are not
employees).
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tors may drive taxicabs3 or over the road tractor-trailer trucks 4 in
the same manner as taxicab drivers or truck drivers who are con-

sidered to be employees. Frequently, "employees" become "independent contractors" when their employer changes their
status.
In 1975, Checker Taxi and Yellow Taxi in Chicago replaced
commissioned taxi drivers with drivers who leased cabs from the
companies. 5 Prior to the replacement, the commissioned drivers

had been considered employees under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the companies were obligated to bargain
with their representatives. 6 But subsequent to the replacement, a
question arose as to whether the new lessee drivers would likewise be considered employees under the NLRA. The issue came
to a head when, in 1980, the drivers became dissatisfied with the
terms of their leases. They organized, and when the companies
refused to bargain with them, they picketed cab company facilities. 7 The companies sued for violation of state antitrust law8
and, arguing that the picketing was prohibited secondary pressure
under the NLRA, 9 sought an injunction, damages and relief
through the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).I 0 The outcome of the various legal proceedings turned on whether the

drivers were "employees" or "independent contractors."' I The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit readily concluded that the lessee drivers were independent
contractors and therefore not entitled to bargain collectively with
2
the cab companies.'
Meanwhile, in Wisconsin, migrant farmworkers from Florida

and Texas were harvesting pickles and collecting wages which
were based on the prices the farm owners eventually received for
3. See Local 777, Democratic Union Org.. Comm., Seafarers Int'l Union v.
NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (criticizing NLRB inconsistency).
4. See NLRB v. Tri-State Transp. Co., 649 F.2d 993, 997 (4th Cir. 1981)
(holding that driver of tractor-trailer rig was not employee of transport
corporation).
5. Production Workers Union, Local 707 v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 323, 325 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.at n.1.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).
10. 793 F.2d at 325 & n.1.
11. Id.; see also Yellow Cab Co. v. Production Workers Union, Local 707, 92
Ill. App. 3d 355, 359, 416 N.E.2d 48, 52 (1980) (Illinois state court denied motion for preliminary injunction against union).
12. 793 F.2d at 325.
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the crop.' 3 The Secretary of Labor concluded that the pickle laborers were working in violation of federal minimum wage, overtime and child labor laws. 14 The owners of the pickle farms
disagreed, arguing that the workers were independent contractors and therefore not covered by these federal statutes. 15 Eventually, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the pickle workers were "employees" under a
seven-factor balancing test.' 6 In the view of concurring Circuit
Judge Easterbrook, that same test could result in finding Pittsburgh Plate Glass to be an "employee" of General Motors,' 7 a
consultant analyzing an assembly line to be an "employee" of the
manufacturer,' 8 every lawyer in the United States who does not
13. Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1532 (7th Cir. 1987),
petition for cert.filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3806 (U.S. May 9, 1988) (No. 87-1853).
14. 835 F.2d at 1531-32.
15. Id. at 1533-34.
16. Id. at 1535, 1538. The seven factors that the Lauritzen court considered
in determining whether the pickle workers were "employees" were:
1) the nature and degree of alleged employer's control as to the manner in which the work is to be performed; 2) the alleged employee's
opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill;
3) the alleged employee's investment in equipment or material required for his task, or his employment of workers; 4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill; 5) the degree of permanency and
duration of the working relationship; 6) the extent to which the service
rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer's business; 7) the
degree to which the alleged employee's family depends on the
employer.
Id.
17. Id. at 1540 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). Judge Easterbrook discussed
the problems which may arise from application of the balancing test that the
court adopted. Id. at 1539 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). Under the first factor-"the extent to which the supposed employer possesses a right to control
the workers' performance"-Judge Easterbrook argued that the emphasis
placed on the "right to control" would result in a finding that "everyone" is an
employee. Id. at 1540 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). Judge Easterbrook stated:
My colleagues admit that the migrant workers controlled their own
working hours and picking methods, but discount these facts on the
ground that what counts is Lauritzen's "right to control ...the entire
pickle-farming operation." If this is so, Pittsburgh Plate Glass must be
an "employee" of General Motors because GM controls "the entire automobile manufacturing process" in which the windshields from PPG
are used ....
Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
18. Id. (Easterbrook,J., concurring). Judge Easterbrook also found the second factor-"whether the worker has an opportunity to profit (or is exposed to a
risk of loss) through the application of managerial skills"-to be unhelpful in
determining whether the migrant workers are "employees." Id. (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring). While the Lauritzen court found that this factor indicated "employment" because each worker had only to invest in the cost of work gloves and
therefore had no investment to lose, Judge Easterbrook disagreed and pointed
out that "[a] consultant analyzing the operation of an assembly line also may
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have a law library of her own to be an "employee" of her client,' 9
hamburger turners at McDonald's restaurants to be "independent
contractors '"20 and suppliers of tires to Chrysler Corporation to
2
be "employees." '
Some evidence exists of a trend toward the decentralization
22
of work in American and other western postindustrial societies.
Part of this decentralization, it appears, is the redistribution of
work from groups of employees to persons likely to be "independent contractors" under present law. One of the manifestations of the Industrial Revolution was that more and more work
associated with production was brought into a vertically integrated enterprise and performed by employees of that enterprise.
The decentralization phenomenon reverses this trend, with work
formerly performed by employees of a vertically integrated enterprise being performed by persons not within the legal definition
of employee.23
In addition to decentralization, demographic factors for the
next generation of potential workers will put pressure on employers to organize work to accommodate the needs of women and
the elderly who will not be in the labor force unless they can have
flexible schedules and flexible places of work.2 4 If mothers and
furnish few tools except for a stopwatch, pencil, and clipboard but such a person
unquestionably is an independent contractor." Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 1540-41 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). Under the third factor"the worker's investment in... physical capital"-Judge Easterbrook, drawing
an analogy to the legal field, concluded that the mere fact that a worker possesses little or no physical capital in the employer's operation does not mean
that the worker is an employee. Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 1541 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). Judge Easterbrook also did
not see why the fifth factor-'"the degree of permanency and duration of the
working relationship"-should be significant in determining whether a worker is
an "employee" or "independent contractor." Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
"Lawyers may work for years for a single client but be independent contractors
[while] hamburger-turners at fast-food restaurants may drift from one job to the
next yet to be employees throughout." Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
21. Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring). Concluding that "[e]veytlhing the employer does is 'integral' to its business," Judge Easterbrook also found the sixth
factor-the extent to which the service rendered is an integral part of the employer's business"-to be meaningless. Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
22. See W. ABERNATHY, K. CLARK & A. KANTROW, INDUSTRIAL RENAISSANCE
App. A, at 131-34 (1983) (explaining tendency toward concentration as industries mature and converse tendency toward deconcentration when major technical changes slow, but growth persists).
23. Id. at 17-21.
24. W.JOHNSTON & A. PACKER, WORKFORCE 2000: WORK AND WORKERS FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY xii-xxvii (1987) (summarizing trends in American
work force).
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grandparents work at the hours and locations that they choose,
they almost certainly would be independent contractors under
present legal concepts. 25
Under the influence of these trends, if the existing legal definitions of employee continue to apply, labor and employment law
will apply to a diminishing universe of legal relations.
Where the line should be drawn between employees and independent contractors is an old question; so old that the law
draws the line according to nineteenth century tort liability concerns rather than twenty-first century employment policy concerns. Where the line is drawn is of new importance. A few legal
actors have begun to question the appropriateness of the old
ideas about independent contractors in labor law. Circuit Judge
Easterbrook recently suggested scrapping current definitions and
replacing them with a standard that comports with workplace realities and actual employment policy concerns. 26 The Easterbrook initiative should be embraced, in the sense that the
question should be reopened.
Two things are evident. The first is that the boundary between employment relations and other legal relations is not immutable. Legislatures or courts can change definitions of
employee if it seems desirable to do so. The other evident proposition is that labor and employment law should not govern all
legal relations, such as those between parent and child, trustee
and beneficiary and decedents and heirs or devisees. Therefore,
any change in the definition of employee intended to expand the
universe of economic relations to which labor and employment
law applies should not be so revolutionary as to encompass transactions not having most of the same characteristics of legal relations traditionally understood to be "employment."
This article considers the merits of expanding statutory definitions of employee to encompass a significant part of the uni25. For a discussion of the distinction between employees and independent
contractors in American labor law, see infra notes 99-121 and accompanying
text.
26. Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539-45 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring), petitionfor cert.filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3806 (U.S. May 9,
1988) (No. 87-1853). Judge Easterbrook found the balancing test used by the
court to define "employee" was unsatisfactory in the guidance it provided for
courts that would consider the question in the future. 835 F.2d at 1539-45 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). He suggested the formulation of a method which
would encompass the "economic realities" of the case so that workers would
know the legal standard before they act. Id. at 1539 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). For a criticism of Judge Easterbrook's theory, see infra note 267 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss6/3

6

Perritt: Should Some Independent Contractors Be Redefined as Employees und

1988]

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS AS "EMPLOYEES"

995

verse of independent contractors, suggesting that, particularly
under the National Labor Relations Act, 2 7 change is appropriate.

Part II considers whether arm's-length relationships must be left
to regulation by private contract. 28 Part III provides historical
background and considers the emergence of the current legal distinction between employees and independent contractors. 29 Part
IV explains the current definitions of employee and independent
contractor.30 Part V identifies the major policy issues raised by
any proposal to change the definitions, including the justification
for excluding some sellers of services by characterizing them as
independent contractors. 3 ' Part VII considers an implicit model
for redefining employee, drawn from antitrust labor exemption
33
analysis. 3 2 Part VIII discusses models developed in Canada.
Part IX proposes new criteria for use in the United States. 34
The core argument developed in this article is that the scope
of collective bargaining is restricted unduly by an anachronistic
exclusion of independent contractors from coverage by the National Labor Relations Act, and that, while the scope of employment statutes affording rights to individual employees is not
artificially restricted in the same way, the existing criteria are unpredictable and should be simplified.
27. The scope of the definition of employee is narrower under the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) than under the discrimination and health and
safety laws. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982) (defining employee for purposes
of NLRA) with 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1982) (defining employee for purposes of age
discrimination in employment statute) and 29 U.S.C. § 652(6) (1982) (defining
employee for purposes of the Occupational Safety and Health Act). For a discussion of current statutory definitions of employee, see infra notes 122-68 and
accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of whether arm's-length relationships must be left to
private contract, see infra notes 35-57 and accompanying text.
29. For an historical background and discussion of the emergence of the
current legal distinctions between employees and independent contractors, see
infra notes 58-121 and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of the current definitions of employee and independent contractor, see infra notes 122-68 and accompanying text.
31. For a discussion of the major policy issues raised by any proposal to
change the definitions of employee and independent contractor, including the
justification for excluding some sellers of services by characterizing them as independent contractors, see infra notes 169-202 and accompanying text.
32. For a discussion of an implicit model for redefining "employee" which
is drawn from antitrust labor exemption analysis, see infra notes 211-35 and accompanying text.
33. For a discussion of Canadian models for redefining employee, see infra
notes 236-55 and accompanying text.
34. For a discussion of recommendations for redefining the concept of an
employee in American labor law, see infra notes 256-75 and accompanying text.
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MUST ARM'S-LENGTH RELATIONSHIPS BE LEFT TO
REGULATION BY PRIVATE CONTRACT?

In order to structure the discourse about the independent
contractor phenomenon in labor law, it is appropriate to consider
a broader legal context. A variety of legal doctrines, statutory labor law, common-law contract and statutory franchise law govern
35
the relations between sellers and purchasers of human services.
A.

Available Modes of Regulation

Legal relations involving economic production are governed
residually by the law of contract. The parties are free to determine the rights and obligations of each party to the contract.
Thus, a manufacturer and its suppliers can make whatever arrangements they wish and the courts will enforce their contract.
There are, however, specialized bodies of law that are superimposed on this baseline of freedom of contract.
Employment law practitioners, decisionmakers and commentators frequently assume that "arm's-length," "independent contractor" relationships are not amenable to detailed statutory and
administrative regulation, and, therefore, that the existing distinctions between employees and independent contractors are necessary. This is not so. Consumer protection statutes are
superimposed on contractual relations between sellers and ultimate consumers. These statutes, like the labor and employment
laws, are justified on the basis of unequal bargaining power.
Another example of statutory law superimposed upon base36
line contract law is the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
Rather than intending to redress unequal bargaining power, the
UCC is intended to make contractual relations more
37
predictable.
One clear example of statutory regulation of a special type of
arm's-length relationship is laws that exist in many jurisdictions
applicable to the relationship between suppliers and franchisees.
Typically, these statutes restrict the rights of the supplier and are
35. See infra notes 36-57 and accompanying text.

36. U.C.C. §§ 1-101 to 2-725 (1962).
37. Id. § 1-102(2). Section 1-102(2) provides: "Underlying purposes and
policies of this Act are (a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial
practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties; (c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions." Id.
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justified, like the labor laws, by the fact that franchisees possess
inferior bargaining power.
B.

Franchisee Protection

Legislatures modify freedom of contract principles when
there is an inequality of bargaining power inherent in the parties'
relationship. This legislative recognition of inequality of bargaining power is not limited solely to the area of labor relations. For
instance, federal and state statutes govern the rights and obligations of parties to a franchise agreement.
In 1978, Congress enacted the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA) 38 which expressly limits a franchisor's right to
terminate its agreement with retailer or distributor franchisees. 3 9
Additionally, the PMPA requires the franchisor to compensate retailer/distributor franchisees when a termination is occasioned by
condemnation, 40 and requires a franchisor who rebuilds a destroyed operation to accord the franchisee first right of refusal on
the franchise. 4 ' Franchisees who prevail in litigation against
franchisors may collect reasonable attorney fees and expert wit42
ness fees.
Many states have enacted similar petroleum industry
franchise statutes or franchise laws of general application. The
New Jersey Franchise Practices Act 4 3 is a general franchise statute. In Westfield Center Service, Inc. v. Cities Service Oil Co. ,44 the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that the lessee-franchisee was entitled
to compensation and attorney fees under the New Jersey statute
when the franchisor terminated the franchise for reasons other
than the franchisee's breach of the agreement. 4 5 The franchisor
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806 (1982).
39. Id. § 2802(b). See Slatky v. Amoco Oil Co., 830 F.2d 476, 478 (3d Cir.
1987) ("Congress found that franchisors had used their superior bargaining
power and the threat of termination to gain an unfair advantage in contract
disputes.").
40. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(d)(1) (1982).
41. Id. § 2802(d)(2).

42. Id. § 2805(d).
43. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 56:10-1 to 10-29 (Supp. 1987).
44. 86 N.J. 453, 432 A.2d 48 (1981) (action instituted by franchisee against
franchisor to enjoin sale of property upon which franchisee's business was
located).
45. Id. at 469-72, 432 A.2d at 57-58. The New Jersey Supreme Court also
held that even if a franchisor terminates the franchise for a good faith, bona fide
reason, its action would constitute a violation of the Franchise Practices Act unless the franchisee had substantially breached its obligations. Id. at 465, 432
A.2d at 55.
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argued that the statutory limitations on the right to terminate for
good cause constituted a violation of constitutional due process
guarantees. 4 6 Further, the franchisor argued that allowing the
franchisee to recover attorney fees was unconstitutional, since no
similar right was afforded franchisors. 4 7 The court rejected these
arguments, stating that the New Jersey Legislature intended to
limit the actions of franchisors to correct the inequality of bargaining power within the relationship and to curb "unconscionable termination provisions that imperil[] innocent franchisees
with substantial losses of their investments. ' 4 8 The court held
that the legislature appropriately awarded attorney fees solely to
franchisees to encourage private enforcement of the statute and
that this provision was consistent with the legislature's intent to
49
make franchisees whole.
The California Franchise Relations Act 50 and the California
Franchise Investment Law 5 ' combine to regulate the franchise relationship in California. The Franchise Investment Law statement of legislative intent specifically acknowledges the
disadvantageous position of franchisees and cites the "substantial
52
losses" franchisees suffer as the motive for the legislation.
The Connecticut general franchise statute 53 states that legislative action was necessary to "offset evident abuses within the
petroleum industry as the result of inequitable bargaining
54
power."
If not for certain economic factors which cause franchisors to
prefer an arm's-length franchise relationship, franchisees in many
industries might be employees of the franchisors. 5 5 Franchisees,
46. Id. at 465-69, 432 A.2d at 55-57.
47. Id. at 469-70, 432 A.2d at 57.
48. Id. at 470, 432 A.2d at 57.
49. Id. at 471-72, 432 A.2d at 58. The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted
the view of the lower court that awarding counsel fees was a step toward correcting the imbalance of power between franchisors and franchisees. Id.
50. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 20000-20010 (West 1987).
51. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West 1977 & Supp. 1988).
52. Id.§ 31001.

53.

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§§ 42-133e to 133m (West 1987).

54. See id. § 42-133j; see also 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 202-1 to 202-8
(Purdon 1988) (Pennsylvania Gasoline, Petroleum Products and Motor Vehicles
Accessories Act) (regulating rights and obligations of petroleum suppliers and
dealers "to avoid undue control of the dealer by the supplier").
55. See generally Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Economics of the Franchise
Contract, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 223 (1978) (analyzing relationship between franchisee
and franchisor).
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however, are not "employees." Even so, law makers have decided
that they must be protected by a special regulatory program.
C.

Migrant Farmworker Protection

Some states have legislation defining the boundary between
employees and independent contractors for particular industries.
The Wisconsin Migrant Law,5 6 for example, requires written migrant work agreements and restricts efforts to remove migrant
farm workers from state labor standards by making them in7
dependent contractors.5
III.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This section considers the early history of labor law, noting
that it applied to legal relations that would not today be considered employment relations.5 8 Viewed from an historical perspective, dividing sellers of services into two groups-employees and
independent contractors-and regulating only the former, is a
relatively new idea.
A.

Emergence of Contemporary Employment Concepts

Present day conceptions of the employment relation, as distinguished from other legal relations, derive from the nature of
the enterprise as it emerged from the Industrial Revolution.
Before the Industrial Revolution, work was done by entrepreneurs and a relatively small number of servants. The legal relations between these masters and servants were not necessarily
regulated by freedom of contract. Rather, as recent commentators on the employment-at-will rule have pointed out, the courts
and legislatures imposed a variety of substantive rights as a matter of policy. 59 For example, masters were obligated to provide
103.90-.97 (West 1987).
57. See id.
58. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
59. H. PERRITr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1.3-1.4, at 6-8
(2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW]. Both master and servant
had duties imposed upon them by common law. Masters were obligated to provide shelter, to supervise development skills and to encourage moral growth.
Servants were obligated to obey the master and work industriously. Id.; see also
Decker, At-Will Employment in PennsylvaniaAfter Banas and Darlington. New Concernsfora Legislative Solution, 32 VILL. L. REV. 101 (1987) (examining modification
of employment-at-will doctrine); Note, The Employment Handbook as a Contractual
Limitation on the Employment-At- Will Doctrine, 31 VILL. L. REV. 335 (1986) (discussing restrictions on doctrine).
56. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
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adequate care for their servants, 60 and servants were precluded
from quitting their employment without adequate notice. 6 1
The motives for this kind of regulation of what today would
be called the employment relationship were (1) to ensure an adequate labor supply,6 2 (2) to prevent competitive pressures on
wage levels by tying servants to their masters6 3 and (3) to reduce
the public welfare burden by requiring masters to take care of
64
their servants.
Masters were independent contractors in a sense, but they
did not work for each other because there was little economic interdependence. So the question of substituting independent contractors (other masters) for employees (servants) was not a real
issue.
These master-servant legal concepts are relevant to the subject of this article because they were the source of the law's preoccupation with the degree of the master's control over his servant.
If the master controlled the economic activity of another person,
the other person was a servant. Whether or not a person was a
servant was important for tort liability purposes but not for labor
law purposes.
The guild system, which generally is recognized as the precursor of the modern trade union movement, was not an institution for regulating post-Industrial Revolution employment
relations; it was an institution for regulating essentially commercial relations among entrepreneurs and between entrepreneurs
and their customers. While the master-servant relation is the historical analog of modern individual employment law, the guild
system is the historical analog of modern collective bargaining
law. The former focuses on the vertical economic relationship;
the latter focuses on horizontal economic relationships. The relevant difference between unions and guilds as instruments for regulating horizontal economic relationships is that guilds addressed
competition among entrepreneurs-independent contractorsand unions are confined to competition among employers and
potential employees.
Originally, merchant guilds effectively controlled commerce
60. EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW, supra note 59, at 6-7; Clark, Medieval Labor
Law and English Local Courts, 27 AM. J. LEGIS. HIST. 330, 339 (1983).
61. See EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW, supra note 59, at 6-8.
62. See Clark, supra note 60, at 333 (summarizing fourteenth-century statutes requiring able-bodied persons to present themselves for work).

63. See id.
64. See id. at 339.
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in local market areas, taking on governmental functions as well. 65

6
Market guilds encompassed all forms of commercial activity, 6
guaranteeing members free trade within their town and excluding
all outsiders from town markets. 6 7 Guilds sought charters from
the king, seeking the right to control trade within their town by
excluding all others, while simultaneously seeking to escape such
restrictions when imposed by other guilds. 68 By the late fourteenth century, guilds had fragmented into more specialized craft
guilds. 6 9 Craft guilds set standards for workmanship and prices
and sought generally to restrict competition within their jurisdictions. 70 The market power of the craft guild, representing individual artisans, eroded as more successful entrepreneurs
aggregated capital and formed "livery companies" to organize
7
production on a larger scale. '

B.

Why Independent Contractors Became Employees

Two motivational questions are of interest in the history of
the employment relation as contrasted with the independent contractor relation. First, what motivated enterprises to treat providers of service as employees instead of independent contractors as
the Industrial Revolution proceeded? Second, what motivates
employers of the present time to prefer the independent contractor relation to the employment relation? The forces that led to
turning independent contractors into employees were based in
the Industrial Revolution and the emergence of mass manufacturing. However, patterns of economic activity are changing. It may
be time to reexamine the principles that define the boundary between employee and independent contractor in light of this new
economic reality.
It is easier to speculate about the answer to the second question than to the first question because the distinction between the
65. S. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION 117-18 (1987) (exploring history of guilds).

66. Market guilds also served social functions such as running public life in
the municipality. Id.
67. Id. at 62.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 118. The craft guild was increasingly specialized and no longer
able to assume municipal functions as its predecessor, the merchant guild, once
had. Id.

70. Id.
71. Id. "Livery companies" relied upon an even greater level of specialization than the craft guilds while still attempting to gain exclusive control over
significant blocks of trade. Id.
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two relations is relatively well established under present law. One
reason for the present preference for independent contractor relations is that employers clearly need not provide benefits such as
health insurance and pensions to independent contractors. 72 A
second obvious motivation for many employers to prefer the independent contractor relation is that it eliminates the possibility
of union organization. 73 A third possibility is that the employer
avoids state and federal labor standards legislation.7 4 All of these
reasons involve avoidance of labor costs resulting from labor legislation. If these are the primary motivations for the shift toward
independent contractor relations, the shift can be characterized as
a means of evading the labor laws. Such a characterization leads
naturally to an argument that the labor laws should be made to
serve their intended purposes by redefining the coverage of the
labor laws to include at least some "independent contractor"
relations.
There may be economic motives other than legal evasion,
however. It may be that the early benefits of greater control over
the activities of the employees rather than outside contractors has
diminished for some reason, either because of changes in technology or because of changes in managerial philosophy. If this is
so, the shift toward independent contractors in lieu of employees
may simply represent an undoing of the original economic motivation to treat providers of services as employees.
The Industrial Revolution generally is viewed as a substitution of bureaucratic controls for market controls for major parts
of the economic process. This substitution was made possible
and desirable by changes in technology. By integrating, by bringing providers of services into enterprises as employees, entrepreneurs gained more control over them. But the question remains,
why does the employer have more control in the employment relation than the purchaser of contractor services has in the independent contractor relation?
The Industrial Revolution led to the integrated enterprise
72. Costs of employee benefits now exceed thirty-five percent of total pay-

roll costs. R. HENDERSON,
ANCE 334 (3d ed. 1982).

COMPENSATION MANAGEMENT:

REWARDING PERFORM-

73. See Bioff & Paul, Employees and Independent Contractors: Legal Implications of
Conversionfrom One to the Other, 4 COMM. & ENT. 649, 649 (1982) (principal motive
for employers to prefer independent contractors is to avoid labor laws). The
NLRA protects collective bargaining activities only for statutory employees. See
infra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
74. For a discussion of labor market analysis of employee/independent
contractor status, see infra notes 211-35 and accompanying text.
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and its demand for large numbers of employees. Bigger markets
resulted from improved transportation and communication. Bigger markets meant more competitors. Improved technology
meant economies of scale. More competition, especially from the
larger, more efficient enterprises, squeezed out the individual
producers. The larger enterprises needed a high degree of control and predictability which they could get with employees working under bureaucratic rules, but which was not possible with an
increasingly complex web of commercial relationships with individual entrepreneurs.
The Industrial Revolution in the United States began with
transportation and communication, spread to distribution of
goods and thence to manufacturing. The revolution in transportation that came with the railroad and the revolution in communication that came with the telegraph vastly extended the markets
into which a single entrepreneur could sell. Larger demand resulting from larger markets meant that even individual entrepreneurs could specialize and still have enough to occupy their full
time. But even with specialization, as long as output was limited
by animal, human, wind and water power, market mechanisms
75
were adequate to effect coordination among producers.
The introduction of advanced technologies made the shortcomings of market regulation visible. Railroads were the first
truly large scale enterprise in the United States. 76 Railroads
could not be operated by single entrepreneurs relying on freemarket transactions with other entrepreneurs. The complexity of
a railroad operation spanning many miles required precision of
scheduling, predictability of operations, and gradually yielded a
bureaucratic hierarchy of rules. 7 7 Railroads required employees.
Standardization of purchasing, necessary if the locomotives and
cars were to operate together and if the rails, crossties and spikes
were to fit together, required staff employees. 7 8 Alliances (cartels) among growing local railroad enterprises failed to stabilize
prices and ensure access to markets and stimulated the formation
79
of regional systems like the Pennsylvania Railroad.
As railroads expanded markets, the economic system for distributing goods grew commensurately more complex. As the
75. A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND:
AMERICAN BUSINESS 50-51 (1977).

THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN

76. Id. at 81-89.
77. Id. at 87.

78. Id. at 182.
79. Id at 156-57.
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scale of operations increased, a distribution system based on commissioned merchant transactions was overburdened. 80 Wholesalers had to integrate the movement of goods from hundreds of
manufacturers and purchasing officers to thousands of retailers. 8'
This required a hierarchy of salaried managers. 82 Internalizing
more market transactions improved the speed with which merchandise turned, thereby improving productivity and reducing
83
margins in wholesaling and retailing.
Meanwhile the revolution also affected production. As markets expanded due to the transportation, communications and
distribution revolutions, technology was making larger scale production more economical. Even before markets expanded, shoe
manufacturing had found that the "putting out system," under
which workers produced in their own homes with tools and raw
materials supplied by an entrepreneur, was less efficient than
moving the production to a central location, where resupply, delivery and supervision costs were less. 84 Steam power and more
sophisticated production machinery hastened centralization and
integration of manufacturing enterprises in several ways. First, it
required much greater capital expenditure, requiring in turn
greater output to generate an adequate return on the capital. A
clear example is a three-shift operation, possible in a large enterprise with many employees, impossible if a single entrepreneur
without employees owns and operates the same machine. Manufacturing needed a high rate of "throughput"-capital utilization-to compete effectively. 8 5 Efficiencies came more from
increasing the speed of production, in order to increase the
throughput, than from increasing the physical scope or numbers
of persons employed in the production.8 6 Improved throughput
was achieved by placing and operating production machinery so
that it was integrated and synchronized technologically and organizationally within a single enterprise; each production stage was
located as close as possible to the preceding stage. 8 7 This resulted in much higher throughput than if the individual produc80.

J. BENIGER,

THE CONTROL REVOLUTION

254 (1986).

81. Id. at 255.
82. Id. at 257-58.
83. A. CHANDLER, supra note 75, at 237.
84. Id. at 54.

85. Id. at 241.
86. Id.at 244; J. BENIGER, supra note 80, at 240.
87. J. BENIGER, supra note 80, at 241.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss6/3

16

Perritt: Should Some Independent Contractors Be Redefined as Employees und

1988]

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS AS "EMPLOYEES"

1005

tion stages were in separate establishments.88
The need for higher throughput necessarily led to integration because internal bureaucracy was more efficient in coordinating the tasks than were market mechanisms.8 9 Negotiating
commercial contracts is slower and less standard than enforcing
enterprise rules. An independent entrepreneur decides for himself when he will start work, when he will quit for the day, the
pace at which he will work, at least some aspects of product design and the nature of the capital equipment that he will use. Internalizing the transactions among producing units meant that
transactions could be routinized, thereby reducing their cost; that
the cost of obtaining information on markets and sources of supply could be shared among many production, purchasing and distribution units when they were integrated; and that the work
could flow faster and more smoothly between units due to better
scheduling.9 0
The combination of integration and collective bargaining
produced a system that satisfied the usually conflicting goals of
higher efficiency (because integration gave entrepreneurs more
control) and higher employee welfare (because collective bargaining created a way of limiting competition among employees which
was not legally permissible among competing individual
producers).
The Industrial Revolution changed the relation between
providers of personal services and entrepreneurs not so much by
increasing dependency as by fragmenting the types of services to
be provided. 9 ' The level of dependency between master and servant was probably higher before the Industrial Revolution when,
as Blackstone pointed out, the master had an obligation to care
for the servant during all the revolutions of the seasons, and the
servant had the obligation to obey the master. 92 The law during
this era discouraged labor mobility.9 3 Therefore, it presumably
was more difficult for a servant to leave a particular master and
find alternative employment. The Industrial Revolution diminished dependency in this sense because it increased labor mobility. But the Industrial Revolution increased entrepreneurial
88. A. CHANDLER, supra note 75, at 241.
89. Id. at 208.
90. Id. at 6-7.
91. See generallyJ. ATLESON, VALUES AND AssuMvTiONS IN AMERICAN
LAw (1983) (examining beginnings of employee dependency).
92. See EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAw, supra note 59, at 6-7.
93. See id. at 6-8.
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control by fragmenting the type of work performed by providers
of personal services.
Indeed, some students of the Industrial Revolution and the
move to the factory system have observed that the inexorable tendency was for work to be defined in ways to make employees fungible and thereby easily replaceable. 9 4 When the goal for the
entrepreneur is to make deliverers of personal services fungible
and to fragment tasks, it is essential that the entrepreneur control
the performance of tasks in considerable detail by enforcing
boundaries. This notion of control represents a fundamental loss
of autonomy for the provider of services and is preserved today as
a fundamental distinction between independent contractors and
employees.
But these factors leading to conversion of independent contractors into employees are artifacts of the Industrial Revolution
and mass manufacturing. If patterns of economic activity are
changing; if a new Industrial Revolution is underway; 9 5 there is
no reason why the boundary line between employee and independent contractor should be the same as that of the first Industrial Revolution. It is possible that the first Industrial
Revolution produced a legitimate economic need for integration,
which then took on a momentum of its own, unwarranted by underlying economic reality. 9 6 Currently, there may be a countertrend, fueled by a perceived need to reduce managerial overhead
and bureaucratic inflexibility, 9 7 to reduce integration to the opti98
mum level required by production coordination requirements.
94. SeeJ. ATLESON, supra note 91, at 172-73.
95. See R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 119-39 (1983) (high-volume standardized production inadequate for current economic environment).
96. But see Sticklet & Nelson, Doctors and Unions: Is Collective Bargaining the
CureforPhysicians'LaborPains? 13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 4, 6-7 (1987) (trend toward
physicians becoming employees rather than independent contractors).
97. G. PINCHOT, INTRAPRENEURING (1985) (encouraging spirit of entrepreneur to spread throughout large corporations creating entrepreneurial concept).
98. See generally Rubin, supra note 55. Rubin examines the nature of the
franchise contract under the theory of the firm. Id. at 223. Rubin begins by
considering the institutional structure of the franchise and examining the elements of a franchise contract as well as the interplay between the franchisee and
the franchisor. Id. at 224-25. Rubin next discusses the standard explanation of
franchising in terms of capital markets, namely that franchising is commonly
considered "a method used by the franchisor to raise capital." Id. at 225. However, he rejects the idea that capital motivates franchising. Id. Rubin offers an
alternative explanation and considers the benefits which could be derived by
both the franchisor and franchisee if the franchise relationship were less physically removed. Id. at 226-30. Finally Rubin considers some antitrust implications of the franchise contract. Id. at 230-32.
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Emergence of the Distinction Between Employees and Independent
Contractors in American Labor Law

This distinction between employees and independent contractors arose for tort purposes and was simply transferred to labor law. 99 The distinction only exists in labor law because
statutes regulating collective bargaining and statutes affording
rights to "employees" exist. The National Labor Relations Act
was enacted in 1935, and the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938.
Before that, the Railway Labor Act ignored any possible distinction between employees and independent contractors, based as it
is on practices developed in the railroad industry. Only the Norris-LaGuardia Act framed a statutory definition of employee,
drawn from labor market competition concepts. 100 Other labor
statutes relied on common-law definitions developed to serve tort
policies. 101
The distinction between employees and independent contractors originated in the distinction between servants and independent contractors in applying vicarious tort liability concepts
to the master-servant relationship.10 2 The right-to-control test
was developed in the mid-nineteenth century by English courts
and was quickly adopted by American courts.1 0 3 Although the
outcome of the right-to-control test was always difficult to predict
in particular factual situations, 10 4 it did fit conceptually with the
central tort doctrine that liability should be imposed only for
99. See Bendel, The Dependent Contractor. An Unnecessary and Flawed Development in Canadian Labour Law, 32 U. TORONTO L.J. 374, 374 (1982) (tracing history
and development of term "employee" which has no common-law meaning of its
own).

100. See H.

PERRirT, LABOR INJUNCTIONS

§ 1.13, at 23 (1986) (explaining

common law definition of legitimate employee interests) [hereinafter LABOR
INJUNCTIONS]; id. § 2.14, at 69- 0 (distinguishing interests of employees in same
industry from interests of laboring classes in general).
101. Some other labor statutes which relied upon common-law definitions
include the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982); the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1982); the Railway Labor Act, 45
U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982); and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
102. See Stevens, The Test of the Employment Relation, 38 MICH. L. REV. 188,
189-97 (1939) (control test leads to confusion when determining worker's
status).
103. Id. at 193-94.
104. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 120-21 (1944)
(affirming NLRB finding that "newsboys" were employees under NLRA); Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. CH. L. REV. 501, 502 (1935)
(discussing problems and confusion caused by defining independent contractor
as "a person who undertakes to complete a specified job without being subject
to the control of his employer").
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fault. The master was in some sense at fault if he controlled or
had the right to control the activities of another person and that
person caused injury to a third party. Those persons over whom
a master had the right of control where the master's "servants."
By the time the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair
Labor Standards Act were enacted, American courts were having
difficulty applying the right-to-control test with respect to the
objectives of then-widespread workers' compensation legislation. 10 5 Commentators were beginning to criticize the utility of
the right-to-control test for defining employee in the context of
06
social legislation.'
The National Labor Relations Board did not explicitly abandon the common-law right-to-control test, but applied it in a flexible manner depending on the facts of particular purchasers and
providers of services. The applicability of common-law distinctions between employees and independent contractors came to a
head in a dispute involving whether newsboys selling a variety of
Los Angeles papers were entitled to be represented for purposes
of collective bargaining.' 0 7 The National Labor Relations Board
concluded that the newsboys were "statutory employees," over
the objections of the Hearst newspapers which argued that the
newsboys were independent contractors. 0 8 The Labor Board did
not disavow common-law criteria,1o9 but applied them in a way
that permitted classifying the newsboys as employees." 0 The
105. See Stevens, supra note 102, at 198-99. Since employers are vicariously
liable for the torts of their employees, employers attempted to use the label of
independent contractor to shield themselves under a blanket of nonliability. Id.
106. Id. at 204. The major criticism of the right-to-control test is that it
assumes that employers actually can control their employees, an assumption
which Stevens felt provided a vague criterion upon which to base the definition
of employee. Id.
107. In re Stockholders Publishing Co. & Newsboys Local 75, 28 N.L.R.B.
1006, 1012-14, 1026-27 (1941) (certifying representatives and reviewing factual
evidence in detail).
108. Id. at 1022-24. The NLRB reasoned that the newspaper companies
"have the right to exercise, and do exercise, such control and direction over the
manner and means in which the newsboys perform their selling activities" as to
establish an employer-employee relationship for purposes of the NLRA. Id. at
1022-23.
109. Id. at 1022. The Board stated: "[W]e are of the opinion that the Companies have the right to ... control [which] establishes the relationship of employer and employee." See In re Seattle Post-Intelligencer Dept. of Hearst
Publications, Inc. & Seattle Newspaper Guild, 9 N.L.R.B. 1262 (1938) (example
of earlier treatment of definition of employee).
110. 28 N.L.R.B. at 1022-23. The common-law control test was applied
more flexibly and the NLRB classified the newspaper's allocation of territories,
removal of newsboys from territories, supervision over their conduct while sell-
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United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined enforcement, finding that the Labor Board had deviated too far
from common-law standards, which the court believed the NLRA
obligated the Board to follow."'
The Supreme Court of the United States, in NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., reversed 1 2 and went considerably further than
did the Labor Board itself. The Court found the common-law
right-to-control test inherently unsuitable for defining the mean3
ing of employee under the National Labor Relations Act. 1 It
noted that inconsistency in applying the common-law test was
rampant,' "4 and that the policies served by the common-law test
are not the same policies promoted by the National Labor Relations Act." 15 In particular it noted that equalizing bargaining
power and preventing disruptions to commerce implicate relations between many common-law independent contractors and
purchasers of their services to the same extent that it implicates
relations between common-law employees and their employers.116 The Court approved the exercise of considerable discretion by the National Labor Relations Board to construe the
statutory term according to practical industrial relations reality
17
and the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act."
This was not the law for long, however, under the National
Labor Relations Act. The Hearst decision engendered significant
opposition, and the Congress overturned it in the 1947 TaftHartley amendments to the NLRA. The principles articulated in
Hearst have continued to govern application of the employee defi8
nition of the Fair Labor Standards Act.1
ing and direction in telling the newsboys how to display their papers as strong
evidence of control. Id.; see In re Hearst Publications, Inc. & Newsboys Local 75,
39 N.L.R.B. 1245 (1942) (deciding refusal-to-bargain charge).
111. Hearst Publications, Inc. v. NLRB, 136 F.2d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 1943),
rev'd, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
112. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
113. Id. at 122.
114. Id. at 123-24.
115. Id. at 129. The Supreme Court held that the common-law classifications which limited the employee concept should be replaced by the broad interretations set forth by the NLRA under which underlying economic factors had
ecome the vital criteria for defining employee. Id.
116. Id. at 125-28.
117. Id. at 130. The Court gave the NLRB the power to create definitive
limitations on the term "employee" and held that "it is not the court's function
to substitute its own inferences of fact for the Board's, when the latter have support in the record." ld.
118. See Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 259 (1945) (approving Department of Labor order subjecting homeworkers to FLSA based on their com-
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In overturning Hearst, the House Committee said:
An "employee," according to all standard dictionaries,
according to the law as the courts have stated it, and according to the understanding of almost everyone, with
the exception of members of the National Labor Relations Board, means someone Who works for another for
hire. But in the case of. . .Hearst . . .the Board expanded the definition of the term "employee" beyond
anything that it ever had included before, and the
Supreme Court, relying upon the theoretic "expertness"
of the Board, upheld the Board.... It must be presumed
that when Congress passed the Labor Act, it intended
words it used to have the meanings that they had when
Congress passed the act, not new meanings that, 9 years
later, the Labor Board might think up. In the law, there
always has been a difference, and a big difference, between "employees" and "independent contractors".
"Employees" work for wages or salaries under direct supervision. "Independent contractors" undertake to do a
job for a price, decide how the work will be done, usually
hire others to do the work, and depend for their income
not upon wages, but upon the difference between what
they pay for goods, materials, and labor and what they
receive for the end result, that is, upon profits. It is inconceivable that Congress, when it passed the act, authorized the Board to give to every word in the act
whatever meaning it wished. On the contrary, Congress
intended then, and it intends now, that the Board give to
words not far-fetched meanings but ordinary meanings.
To correct what the Board has done, and what the
Supreme Court, putting misplaced reliance upon the
Board's expertness, has approved, the bill excludes "independent contractors"
from the definition of
"employee". 19
The conferees adopted the House provisions:
The House bill excluded from the definition of "empetitive effects with factory workers); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assoc., 603

F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979) (reversing summaryjudgment against FLSA claimants because district court erroneously found their independent contractor characteristics controlling); see, e.g., Fleming v. Demeritt Co., 56 F. Supp. 376, 378
(D. Vt. 1944) (FLSA covers more than common-law servants; citing Hearst).

119. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., at 18 (1947) (citation
omitted).
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ployee" individuals having the status of independent
contractors. Although independent contractors can in
no sense be considered to be employees, the Supreme
Court in... Hearst. ..held that the ordinary tests of the
law of agency could be ignored by the Board in determining whether or not particular occupational groups
were "employees" within the meaning of the Labor Act.
Consequently, it refused to consider the question of
whether certain categories of persons whom the Board
had deemed to be "employees" were not in fact and in
law really independent contractors.
The conference agreement in general follows the
provisions of the Senate amendment, with the following
exceptions:
(D) The conference agreement follows the House
bill in the matter of persons having the status of in2 0
dependent contractors.
The conferees also adopted language in the House
bill excluding from the definition of "employee" individuals having status of independent contractors. While the
Board itself has never claimed that independent contractors were employees, the Supreme Court has held that
the ordinary tests of the law of agency could be disregarded by the Board in determining if petty occupational
groups were "employees" within the meaning of the Labor Relations Act. The Court consequently refused to
consider the question whether certain categories of persons whom the Board had deemed to be "employees"
might not, as a matter of law, have been independent
contractors. The legal effect of the amendment therefore is merely to make it clear that the question whether
or not a person is an employee is always a question of
law, since the term is not meant to embrace persons
outside that category under the general principles of the
12 1
law of agency.
120. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33 (1947) (citation
omitted).
121. 93 CONG. REC. 6441-42 (1947) (citation omitted).
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CURRENT DEFINITIONS

National Labor Relations Act

This is how the National Labor Relations Act defines
employee:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and
shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise,
and shall include any individual whose work has ceased
as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current
labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and
who has not obtained any other regular and substantially
equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or
any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any
individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any
individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act ... as amended from time to time, or by
any other person who is not an employer as herein
22

defined. 1

If a person is not an employee under the NLRA, there are a
number of ramifications: (1) the person is not protected against
adverse employer action due to his concerted activities;' 23 (2) the
purchaser of his services has no legal obligation to bargain with
his representative; 24 (3) a union commits an unfair labor practice
by discouraging the purchaser of his services from dealing with
him on terms less favorable than those afforded to employees of
the purchaser; 125 and (4) efforts by the person to obtain uniform
122. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
123. See Production Workers Union, Local 707 v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 323, 332

(D.C. Cir. 1986).
124. See id.

125. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No.
100, 421 U.S. 616, 626-33 (1975) (finding that agreement was not entitled to
exemption from federal antitrust laws under section 8(e) of NLRA); Los Angeles
Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 99-101 (1962)
(holding that illegal restraint of trade between union and businessmen is not
exempt from sanctions of antitrust laws); Columbia River Packers Ass'n v.
Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 145 (1942) (holding that relationship between processor
of fish and independent fishermen solely concerning terms upon which fish
would be sold but not employer-employee issues was not "labor dispute" under
Norris-LaGuardia Act and not exempt from jurisdiction of Court); Production
Workers, 793 F.2d at 332-33 (concluding that secondary boycott provision does
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terms or to restrict competition from other similarly situated persons may violate state or federal antitrust laws.' 26
B.

Norris-LaGuardiaAct

The Norris-LaGuardia Act deals with the concept of employee in this manner:
A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor
dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged
in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have
direct or indirect interests therein; or who are employees
of the same employer; or who are members of the same
or an affiliated organization of employers or employees;
whether such dispute is (1) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more
employees or associations of employees; (2) between
one or more employers or associations of employers and
one or more employers or associations of employers; or
(3) between one or more employees or associations of
employees and one or more employees or associations of
employees; or when the case involves any conflicting or
competing interests in a "labor dispute" (as defined in
this section) of "persons participating or interested"
12 7
therein (as defined in this section).
In effect the Act extends its protections to "persons" who
compete in the same labor markets by use of the language "who
are engaged in the same in industry, trade, craft or occupation."
C.

Railway Labor Act

The Railway Labor Act (RLA) defines employee as follows:
Fifth. The term "employee" as used herein includes
every person in the service of a carrier (subject to its
continuing authority to supervise and direct the manner
of rendition of his service) who performs any work defined as that of an employee or subordinate official in the
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission now in
effect, and as the same may be amended or interpreted
not proscribe involvement in all picketing by independent contractor but is limited to picketing against neutral parties).
126. See Yellow Cab Co. v. Production Workers Union, Local 707, 92 Ill.
App. 3d 355, 356-57, 416 N.E.2d 48, 50-51 (1980).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 113(a) (1982).
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by orders hereafter entered by the Commission pursuant
to the authority which is conferred upon it to enter orders amending or interpreting such existing orders: Provided, however, That no occupational classification made
by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall
be construed to define the crafts according to which railway employees may be organized by their voluntary action, nor shall the jurisdiction or powers of such
employee organizations be regarded as in any way limited or defined by the provisions of this chapter or by the
orders of the Commission. The term "employee" shall
not include any individual while such individual is engaged in the physical operations consisting of the mining
of coal, the preparation of coal, the handling (other than
movement by rail with standard railroad locomotives) of
coal not beyond the mine tipple, or the loading of coal at
28
the tipple.'
In other words, an employee is an employee.
D.

FairLabor StandardsAct

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) offers its own definition: "Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), the term
'employee' means any individual employed by an employer....
9
'Employ' includes to suffer or permit to work."' 12
E. Age Discriminationin Employment Act
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) creates
this definition: "The term 'employee' means an employee of an
employer who is employed in a business of his employer which
30
affects commerce."
F. Employee Retirement Income Security Act
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
says: "The term 'employee' means any individual employed by an
3
employer."' '
128. 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (emphasis in original).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), (g) (1982).

130. 29 U.S.C. § 652(6) (1982).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (1982).
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Mine Safety and Health Act

The Mine Safety and Health Act (MSHA) has a broader definition: "'miner' means any individual working in a coal or other
13 2
mine."
H.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

The final definition, that of Title VII, provides that:
The term "employee" means an individual employed by
an employer, except that the term "employee" shall not
include any person elected to public office in any State
or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be
on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the
policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect
to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of
the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or
13 3
political subdivision.
I.

Comparison of Definitions of Employee

All of the statutory definitions are essentially tautological,
with the exception of the MSHA and Norris-LaGuardia Act. The
other definitions reflect congressional intent either to incorporate
the common-law standard as it existed on the date of enactment,
or to provide flexibility for administrative agencies and courts to
interpret the employee concept in light of workplace realities and
the policies of the statutes.
Both the current NLRA definition of "employee" and the
limited scope of the definition are illustrated by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's decision in NLRB v. H &
H Pretzel Co. 134 In that case, an employer with a history of ten
successive collective bargaining agreements since 1953 with the
union representing its driver salesmen decided to eliminate col132. 30 U.S.C. § 802(g) (1982); cf. Stroh v. United States Dep't of Labor,
810 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1987) (self-employed trucker who hauled coal at mine
site is "miner" under Black Lung Benefits Act).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1982).
134. 831 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1987); see also NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390
U.S. 254 (1968) (reversing court of appeals and upholding Board determination
that insurance agents were employees).
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lective bargaining when it sold or leased the trucks to the drivers
and assigned them specific routes, "so that they would become
independent contractors under the terms of an agreement to be
presented to each of them."' 1 5 The existing drivers rejected the
proposed independent contractor agreement, and the company
36
replaced them with new hires.'
The union filed an unfair labor practice charge, claiming that
the company violated sections 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the Labor
Management Relations Act by withdrawing recognition from the
union and sections 8(a)(3) and (5) of that Act by instituting the
independent contractor arrangement. The Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ)dismissed a complaint filed on the charge, holding
that the current drivers were not employees. 3 7 The NLRB disagreed, finding that the drivers remained employees. The Sixth
38
Circuit enforced the Board's decision.
The Sixth Circuit articulated the test for distinguishing employees from independent contractors under the definitional section of the NLRA as the common-law, "right-to-control" test.' 3 9
Although it concluded that no single factor was determinative, it
suggested the following guidelines:
40
The intent of the parties creating the relationship.
An employer/employee relationship exists if the purported employer controls or has the right to control
both the result to be accomplished and the manner
and means by which the purported employee brings
4
about the result.' '
The more detailed the supervision and the stricter the
enforcement standards, the greater the likelihood of

135. H & H Pretzel Co., 831 F.2d at 651.
136. Id. at 652-53. Three of the twelve drivers signed the independent contractor agreement. Id. at 653. The nine others were replaced. Id.
137. Id. The Administrative LawJudge ruled that the current drivers could
no longer be represented by the union. Id.
138. Id. The Sixth Circuit indicated that its standard of review with respect
to NLRB decisions was that it was required to affirm a NLRB finding if it was
supported by substantial evidence. Id.
139. Id. For a discussion of the right-to-control test, see supra notes 102-14
and accompanying text.

140. Id. at 654. These factors are set forth in the
§ 220(2) (1958). 831 F.2d at 654.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF AGENCY

141. 831 F.2d at 653-54. Judge Friendly noted that this test is difficult to
apply because the result is necessarily a function of the manner and means employed. Id. at 654 (citing Lorenz Schneider Co. v. NLRB, 517 F.2d 445 (6th Cir.
1975)).
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an employer/employee relationship. 142
If the employer supplies the instrumentalities and place
143
of performance, employee status is more likely.
The greater the length of employment, the greater the
44
likelihood of employee status.1
If the purported employee is paid by time, employee status is more likely than if the purported employee is
145
paid by the job.
If the work is part of the employer's regular business
and/or necessary to it, employee status is more
1 46
likely.
If the work involved is usually done by other firms in the
industry under an employer's direction, employee
status is more likely than if the work usually is done
47
by an unsupervised specialist.'
If the purported employee is engaged in a distinct occupation or business, independent contractor status is
8
more likely.14
The higher the skill involved, the greater the likelihood
149
of independent contractor status.
In the H & H Pretzel case, the drivers leased their trucks from
a company owned by the owner of H & H.' 50 The drivers' work
was controlled extensively by H & H. 15 H & H set the work
week, the frequency of calls on customers, the color and design of
trucks, the cleanliness of drivers and trucks and the qualifications
of anyone hired by the drivers.' 52 H & H also apportioned customers among the drivers and supplied much of the equipment
used by them. 15 The NLRB also noted the lack of evidence of
any proprietary interest in the business on the drivers' part, and
142. Id. (quoting Lorenz Schneider Co. v. NLRB, 517 F.2d 445, 451 (6th
Cir. 1975)).
143. Id. at 654. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 comment k
(1958).
144. 831 F.2d at 654. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 com-

mentj (1958).
145. 831 F.2d at 654.

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 653.
Id.
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the broad authority H & H retained to terminate the arrangement
54
with drivers unilaterally.1
The Sixth Circuit found the conclusory allegations and evidence that the drivers "now drive leased trucks" insufficient to
challenge the "NLRB's well-founded conclusion" that the drivers
55
never became independent contractors.
Somewhat different standards are used to apply definitions of
"employee" under other labor statutes and under social welfare
statutes.1 56 For example, the ERISA definition 15 7 is interpreted
by reference to NLRB concepts and ultimately to common-law
rules. 1558
The'Fair Labor Standards Act definition is characterized as
the broadest among labor statutes.' 59 Rutherford Food Corp. v. Mc0 illustrates this breadth. In Rutherford, the Supreme Court
Comb 16
found meat boners in a slaughterhouse to be employees rather
than independent contractors under the Fair Labor Standards
Act. Even though the workers were under contract, owned their
own tools and were paid based on the weight of beef processed,
they were employees because they worked exclusively for the employer and because their work was but one step in a continuous
process the other steps of which were performed by persons who
admittedly were employees. The courts of appeals generally apply the Rutherford approach, which has come to be called the "eco-

154. Id. at 654. The control that H & H Pretzel Company was exercising
over the drivers, in combination with the lack of proprietary interest and broad
termination authority, strongly supported the NLRB's conclusion that the drivers were still employees. Id.
155. Id.
156. See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 717-18 (1947) (finding unloader of coal to be employee under Social Security Act using Hearst standard).
157. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (1982). For the text of the ERISA definition of
employee, see supra note 131 and accompanying text.
158. See Holt v. Winpisinger, 811 F.2d 1532, 1538 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (applying same factors used in NLRA standard and finding union employee to be "employee" based on high degree of control despite payment through funds usually
used for independent contractors).
159. Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1382 (3d Cir.)
(observing that definitions included in FLSA are extremely general, court
adopted "economic reality" test which allows totality of circumstances to be considered in determining whether workers are "dependent upon the business to
which they render service"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985); see also Secretary of
Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3806 (U.S. May 9, 1988) (No. 871853). Because the FLSA does not offer a dispositive definition for determining
the status of workers, courts must examine "all the circumstances" in order to
find the economic reality. Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
160. 331 U.S. 722, 728-29 (1947).
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nomic realities" test. 16' This test uses some factors similar to
those used for the common-law test, but also emphasizes the degree of economic dependence of the provider of services on the
62
purchaser of services.1
The economic realities test generally is used for Title VII. In
Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospital,'63 the district court,
applying criteria basically similar to NLRA criteria, found that a
physician with staff privileges at a hospital was an independent
contractor rather than an employee under Title VII because the
hospital lacked the right to control the means and manner of the
physician's work performance. l 6 In Frank v. CapitalCities Communications, Inc.,165 the district court found one person to be an employee and the other to be an independent contractor applying
the same standards under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act.' 66 The first individual, found to be an employee, was taken
off salary, but continued to occupy office space and to write for
the company. The second individual, found to be an independent
contractor, began a new job and only wrote for the company on
the side.' 6 7 The distinction was justified by the use of both the
''economic realities" test and the common-law "right to control"
test. 168
V.

POLICY ISSUES

There are two basic policy issues that are raised by consider161. See infra note 162; see also Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181, 188 (5th
Cir.) (applying "economic realities" test under FLSA), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 850
(1983).
162. Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534-35 (7th Cir.
1987) (applying "economic realities" test and explaining dependency factor),
cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 243 (1988); Halferty v. Pulse Drug Co., 821 F.2d 261, 265
(5th Cir.) (same), aff'd on reh 'g, 826 F.2d 2 (5th Cir. 1987); Cobb v. Sun Papers,
Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 341 (11th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982). For
a discussion of Lauritzen, see supra notes 13-26 and accompanying text.
163. 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 197 (D. NJ. 1986).
164. Id. at 199.
165. 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,889 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
166. Id. at 35,912; see also Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 422-23
(7th Cir. 1986) (citing Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341
(D.C. Cir. 1973)) (Title VII affords remedy to nonemployee physician for discrimination by hospital); Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 n.l (5th Cir.
1985) (citing cases applying less stringent test than traditional contractor-employee test in discrimination cases); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 38
(3d Cir. 1983) (hybrid test for Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Comment, Choice of a Test for Coverage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 64
B.U.L. REV. 1145, 1185-86 (1984) (rejecting hybrid test).
167. Frank, 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,889 at 35,912.
168. Id. at 35,911.
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ing some independent contractors to be employees. The first is
whether it would be a good idea to broaden the definition of employee. The second is whether a workable statutory definition of

employee can be derived to include some independent contractors without sweeping up a variety of purely commercial relations.
The second issue is addressed in sections V, (B) and IX below.
A.

Advisability of Broadening the Definition of Employee

Whether it would be a good idea to treat certain independent
contractors as employees depends upon the purpose for which
they would be treated as employees. It might make sense, for example, to treat independent contractors as employees for purposes of organization and representation for collective bargaining
under the National Labor Relations Act, yet not to treat them as
employees for minimum wage and maximum hour standards or
for occupational safety and health standards. Or, it might be desirable to expand the definition for Title VII purposes, but not for
other purposes. It is appropriate, therefore, to consider the practical implications of being an independent contractor as opposed
to being an employee under each of the major labor statutes.
There are a number of implications of not being an employee
as that term is defined under the National Labor Relations Act.
First, only employees are protected by section 7 of the NLRA
against adverse employer action because of their concerted activities. Therefore, an independent contractor terminated because
of an effort to organize with other independent contractors or because of a demand made to the purchaser of the independent
contractor's services on behalf of a number of independent contractors would not have an unfair labor practice remedy under the
69
National Labor Relations Act.
Second, representatives for collective bargaining may be certified under section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act only to
represent groups of employees. A labor organization or other
bargaining agent could not be certified under that section for a
group of independent contractors, and an employer would not be
obligated to bargain with the contractors' representative. 70
Third, agreements among independent contractors to fix the
169. The prohibitions of the NLRA protect employees from termination for
these reasons, but do not protect independent contractors. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1)-(3) (1982).
170. See Production Workers Union, Local 707 v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 323, 325
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding that employer has no obligation to bargain with nonstatutory employees).
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prices charged for their services or to restrict output in order to
bargain more effectively would be a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act unless the agreement were shielded by one of
two labor exemptions to the antitrust laws. 17 1 A statutory labor

exemption applies to horizontal agreements among employees.' 7 2 Though the courts have been uncertain as to whether the
scope of the labor exemption is exactly congruent with the scope
of protected activity under the National Labor Relations Act,173 it
is reasonable to presume that an explicit agreement among independent contractors not qualifying as employees under the National Labor Relations Act would be outside the labor
74
exemption.1
It should be noted that simply because antitrust liability may
exist or because the protections or representation mechanisms
under the NLRA are not available to independent contractors
does not necessarily mean that concerted action by them is itself a
violation of the NLRA. 175
Eliminating all independent contractors from coverage of the
National Labor Relations Act raises more practical problems of
implementation than one might expect. Consider the facts of Production Workers Union, Local 707 v. NLRB. The appeal as it reached
the District of Columbia Circuit involved only the question
whether a labor organization concededly within the scope of the
National Labor Relations Act violated the Act's prohibitions on
secondary pressure when it assisted a group of independent con76
tractor taxi drivers.'
The court decided that no violation by the labor organization
occurred because the nature of the pressure exerted by the independent contractors with the labor organization's assistance
171. See H.A. Artists & Assoc. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 717-22
(1981) (union's regulations are within labor exemption to antitrust laws). For a
discussion of the H.A. Artists case, see infra notes 221-32 and accompanying text.
172. Id. at 713-16. Labor unions enjoy a statutory exemption when acting
in their own self-interest, but not when acting in combination with "nonlabor"
groups. Id.

173. See id.; LABOR INJUNCTIONS, supra note 100, § 2.15, at 72.
174. See infra notes 211-20 and accompanying text discussing American Fed'n
of Musicians v. Carroll,391 U.S. 99, reh 'g denied, 393 U.S. 902 (1968); see also Local

24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959) (collectively bargained
minimum rental requirement for owner-operator truck drivers within labor
exemption).
175. See Production Workers Union, Local 707 v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 323, 325
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (rejecting NLRB conclusion that § 8(b)(4) violation resulted
when union supported independent taxi cab drivers' picketing).
176. Id. at 326.
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was primary.1 7 7 But this issue was the easiest of several that
might have been presented.
For example, are the independent contractor taxi drivers
protected by the statutory labor exemption from antitrust liability
when they act in concert to limit competition among each other
and force the purchaser of their services to improve their compensation? If, as many courts believe, the scope of the statutory
labor exemption is congruent with the scope of NLRA coverage,
the taxi drivers would face antitrust liability.
Clearly, a labor organization would not be statutorily entitled
to organize the independent contractor taxi drivers, nor would
the purchaser of their services commit an unfair labor practice by
discharging them in retaliation for their concerted action.
Moreover, if a union representing employee drivers of the
same company that purchases services or might purchase services
from independent contractor drivers were to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement restricting the taxi company's right to
contract out taxi driving to the independent contractors, the limitation on contracting out might well be found to be a "hot cargo
agreement" prohibited by section 8(e) of the NLRA. 178 Whether
a limitation on contracting violates 8(e) turns mainly on whether
its intent and effect reach more than incidentally into product
market relations. 179 By defining employee so as to exclude independent contractors, labor law makes it likely that competitive
forces among independent contractors will be viewed as product
177. Id. at 333. The court held that the cab companies involved were not
neutral and unconcerned third parties and that § 8(b)(4) bars pressure only
against neutrals. Id.
178. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982). Section 158(e), which is the codification of
§ 8(e) of the NLRA, provides in pertinent part:
Enforceability of contract or agreement to boycott any other employer;
exception
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and
any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or
refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing
in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into
heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such
extent unenforceable and void ....

Id.
179. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No.

100, 421 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1975) (nonunion subcontractors were indiscrimi-

nately excluded from portion of market); In re Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements, 756 F.2d 284, 289 (3d Cir.) (considering union's forbidden secondary
purpose to affect employment relations outside employer), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
863 (1985).
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market forces rather than labor market forces, and thereby not
legitimate for regulation through a collective bargaining
agreement.
The implications of being a contractor as opposed to an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act are that independent
contractors are not entitled to receive overtime pay or the minimum wage under that Act.'8 0
The implications of being an independent contractor as opposed to an employee under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act are that independent contractors are not entitled to have purchasers of their services comply with occupational safety and
health standards promulgated under the Act, at least insofar as
noncompliance with the standards creates risks only to the independent contractors and not also to the employees.' 8 '
The implications of being independent contractors as opposed to employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
83
1964182 and under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act'
are that independent contractors may be subjected to race, religious, sex, national origin or age discrimination without those
8 4
acts being violated.
B.

The Need to Exclude Some Independent Contractors

An extremely simple way to broaden the scope of labor and
employment law is to define "employee" to include anyone who
performs services for another. No one would be excluded because he is an "independent contractor."
The effect of such a broad definition under the National Labor Relations Act would be to obligate purchasers of services to
bargain with representatives of all suppliers of services, to prohibit purchasers from terminating contracts with suppliers because the suppliers act in concert and-presumably' 8 5-to narrow
the operation of the antitrust laws almost to the vanishing point.
180. Brock v. Mr. W. Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042, 1043 (5th Cir.) (reversing district court which found fireworks stand operators not to be employees
and, therefore, not entitled to minimum wage and overtime pay), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 286 (1987).

181. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1) (1982).
182. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
183. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
184. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 262-64 (10th Cir.) (general partner not employee and therefore outside protections of Title VII and

ADEA), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 503 (1987).
185. See LABOR INJUNCTIONS, supra note 100, at § 3.4 (explanation of linkage
between labor statute definitions and antitrust "labor exemptions").
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The effect under the anti-discrimination laws would be to
prohibit race-, sex-, religious-, age- and handicapped-based discrimination in virtually all transactions involving the purchase of
services.
The effect under labor standards laws would be to involve the
government in setting minimum standards for service contracts.
The effect under health and safety statutes would be to impose responsibility on purchasers of services for the working conditions of the suppliers of services, regardless of where the
suppliers work.
Such effects intuitively seem offensive only with respect to
some of the statutory areas. In other words, there may be no
need for recognizing any "independent contractor" status in
some areas of labor law.
C.

ComparativeAssessment of Broadening the Definition of Employee

1. Title VII and the Age Discriminationin Employment Act

The clearest case for broadening the definition of employee
to include independent contractors can be made under the discrimination statutes. 186 There is little reason why purchasers of
services from independent contractors should be allowed to discriminate based on the prohibited characteristics. Title VII has
already been broadened to some extent under a series of court of
8
appeals cases.'

2.

7

National Labor Relations Act

The merits of the case for extending the definition of employee under the National Labor Relations Act to independent
contractors depends upon the degree to which the policy underpinnings of the National Labor Relations Act are implicated in the
case of independent contractors, and on the degree to which expansion of the scope of collective bargaining unacceptably under186. See Comment, The Definition of "Employee" Under Title VII Distinguishing
Between Employees and Independent Contractors, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 203, 212-14
(1984) (reviewing positions taken by courts of appeals on "economic realities"
test and explaining "vulnerability" test applied by Sixth Circuit).
187. See Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 422-23 (7th Cir. 1986)
(citing Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973))
(Title VII affords remedy to nonemployee physician for discrimination by hospital); Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 n.1 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing cases applying less stringent test than traditional contractor-employee test in discrimination

cases).
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mines the procompetition policies of the antitrust laws.188
The starting points for enactment of federal labor legislation
were first, the perceived disparity of bargaining power between
employees and employers which justified government intervention to equalize the ability of both sides to make fair contracts and
thereby to specify the substantive conditions of their relationship;' 8 9 and second, the prevention of disruptions to commerce
by channeling disputes through the collective bargaining
process.1 90
The first of these legislative concerns, equalizing bargaining
power, almost certainly pertains to the ease of independent contractors excluded from the present definition of employee. Individual independent contractors have no more bargaining power
than do individual employees. The second legislative concern,
reducing disruptions to commerce, probably does not apply, because there is virtually no evidence of significant disruptions to
commerce resulting from dissatisfaction by independent
contractors.191
The counterargument regarding broadening the definition of
employee under the National Labor Relations Act is that American labor policy accepts the legitimacy of an employer operating
nonunion, if its employees are willing to have it do so. According
to this argument, if an employer is willing to give up a measure of
control over persons performing services for it, as it must in order
to avoid independent contractors being treated as employees,
then it should be entitled to be free of the legal restrictions associated with employment status.
3.

Fair Labor StandardsAct

The merits of the case for broadening the definition of employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act to include independent contractors depends basically upon the economic impact of
minimum wage and overtime requirements. A substantial debate
188. For an explanation of the ineradicable tension between collective bargaining and market competition, see LABOR INJUNCTIONS, supra note 100, at

§§ 3.3-3.7.
189. 290 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). One of the purposes of the NLRA is to
equalize bargaining power between employers and employees. Id.
190. Id. Another purpose of the NLRA is to minimize disruptions in the
normal flow of commerce. Id.
191. Disruptions may be discouraged because it would be an antitrust violation for independent contractors not within either labor exemption to boycott or
to fix prices. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union
No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
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has raged for many years as to the adverse employment effects of
wage standards legislation. 19 2 Indisputably, one of the original
rationales for the Fair Labor Standards Act overtime provisions
was that it would enhance employment opportunities by making it
cheaper for employers to hire more employees rather than working existing employees more hours. 19 3 Whether or not this is still
true depends upon the relative costs of a new hire (primarily related to benefit costs) as compared with the costs of paying overtime. 19 4 For many large employers, employee benefits cost
approximately forty percent of the straight wage costs.' 9 5 Given
that the overtime premium is fifty percent, the gap is not very
great.' 9 6 So applying the overtime provisions of the FLSA to independent contractors is unlikely to stimulate any significant increase in employment.
Microeconomic theory unequivocally says that increasing the
wage rate by statute decreases the demand for labor. 19 7 Therefore, from a theoretical standpoint, increasing the minimum
wage, or applying minimum wage standards to a larger number of
persons, will decrease to some extent the demand for those persons.' 98 Therefore, the justification for applying minimum wage
standards to additional independent contractors not now covered
would have to be sufficient to outweigh the lost "employment"
opportunities for such independent contractors.
192. See Passell, Minimum Wage: A Tangled Puzzle, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1988,
at D2, col. 1 (higher minimum wage would mean fewer jobs but better pay for
poor workers).
193. Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539-45 (7th Cir.
1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (describing purposes of FLSA), petition for
cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3806 (U.S. May 9, 1988) (No. 87-1853).
194. For example, if a new hire is paid $10 per hour and an existing employee is also paid $10 per hour, adding 40% of the hourly rate in benefits will
increase both wage rates to $14 per hour. If one additional hour of work needs
to be completed, it will cost the employer time and a half for overtime for the
existing employee to do the job, or $21, but only the regular wage rate, or $14,
for a new worker to complete thejob. In reality, however, this example is imperfect because the cost of all benefits is not prorated on an hourly basis. An employer must pay the full health insurance benefits premium no matter how many
hours the new hire works. Pension benefit accruals may be prorated on an
hourly basis however.
195. See R. HENDERSON, supra note 72.
196. That is, the 150% wage rate for an existing employee is not much
greater than the 140% wage rate for a new hire.
197. See T. KOCHAN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
313-14 (1980).
198. ILGWU v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 826-28 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Secretary
failed to consider likelihood that unregulated homework would undercut standards and to justify conclusion that applying FLSA standards to homeworkers
would decrease homework employment), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984).
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This analysis suggests that the existing definition of employee under the FLSA may be satisfactory.
4.

Occupational Safety and Health Act and Mine Safety and Health
Act

Whether the definition of employee under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act' 99 should be expanded depends upon
whether the principal really controls the work environment of the
individual independent contractor 2 0 0 -a determination that can
20 1
adequately be made under the existing criteria.
The same appropriate result is obtained under the Mine
Safety and Health Act: "A mine owner cannot be allowed to exonerate itself from its statutory responsibility for the safety and
health of miners merely by establishing a private contractual relationship in which miners are not its employees and the ability to
20 2
control the safety of its workplace is restricted."
VI.

INTERNAL REVENUE CODE CONTROVERSY

The Internal Revenue Code (Code) obviously is not a labor
statute, but it has a major impact on employment costs based
upon whether an individual performing services is classified
under the Code as an employee or an independent contractor.
Under section 3121 of the Code 20 3 and other similar definitional
provisions, 20 4 employers are obligated to withhold income tax
and social security taxes from employees' wages but not from payments made to independent contractors. Employees are defined
in two basic ways: according to common-law standards, 20 5 and
according to specific Code and regulatory provisions applicable
to defined occupations.2 0 6 In addition, under section 530 of the
199. 29 U.S.C. § 652(6) (1982).
200. See Note, The Duty of an Employer to Provide a Safe Place to Work for the
Employee of an Independent Contractor, 12 N.M.L. REV. 559, 575 (1982) (discussing
issue of employer liability when employer has control of premises).
201. See Cyprus Indus. Minerals Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 664 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1981) (citation against mine operator
upheld even though person at risk was independent contractor).
202. Id. at 1120 (quoting Secretary of Labor v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Fed.
Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n (1979)).
203. 26 U.S.C. § 3121 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
204. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 3306 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
205. See Marvel v. United States, 719 F.2d 1507, 1514 (10th Cir. 1983)
(common-law rules applicable to define employee under Internal Revenue
Code); 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(d)-1(c) (1988) (restating common-law tests); Rev.
Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (identifying twenty criteria).
206. See 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(d)-l(d) (1988) (agent-drivers and commission
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Revenue Act of 1978, certain persons not treated as employees
were "grandfathered," even though they might meet the common-law or industry-specific definitions. 20 7 Then, in section 1706
of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Congress added a new subsection
(d) to section 530 un-grandfathering engineers, designers, drafters, computer programmers and systems analysts who work
through brokers controlled by themselves, 20 8 making it likely that
many such persons would be reclassified as "employees," thereby
"creating a hornet's nest of confusion and controversy."2 0 9
The motive for the change was to eliminate the competitive
advantage enjoyed by firms that treated technical workers as
independent contractors,
thereby avoiding
withholding
obligations.210
The tax controversy is pertinent to the subject of this article
for a number of reasons: it is an area of current controversy
about employee/independent contractor distinctions; it illustrates
a piecemeal statutory approach to redefining employee; and it illustrates the competitive implications of making employees into
independent contractors.
VII.

LABOR MARKET COMPETITION MODEL
FROM ANTITRUST LAW

Antitrust law provides a model for distinguishing employees
from independent contractors. Like the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
antitrust law focuses on the scope of labor market competition
between employees and allegedly independent contractors.
Some independent contractors are in direct competition with
those who fit within the labor statutes' definitions of employee.
When independent contractors compete with statutory employees
drivers distributing meat, vegetables, fruit, bakery products and beverages except milk, laundry or dry cleaning; life insurance salesmen; certain homeworkers; and full-time sales representatives).
207. See generally Solomon & Schlesinger, Section 1706. Where It Came from
and Where It Is Going, 66 TAXES, THE TAX MAGAZINE 50 (1988) (stating commonlaw tests).
208. Compare Solomon & Schlesinger, supra note 207, at 52 (quoting Committee Reports to Tax Reform Act of 1986, General Explanation at 1343) (example of problem) with I.R.S. Notice 87-19, 1987-1 C.B. 455 (common-law
standards continue to control two-party relationship while 1986 changes were
aimed at three-party relationship and outline conditions under which taxpayer
can treat worker as nonemployee).
209. Solomon & Schlesinger, supra note 207, at 51.
210. Id. at 52.
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for wages and improved working conditions, they function economically just like statutory employees.
The Supreme Court recognized that independent contractors compete directly with traditional employees for wages and
desirable working conditions in American Federation of Musicians v.
Carroll.21 ' In this case, a group of orchestra leaders alleged that
the union violated antitrust laws by compelling the orchestra
leaders to become union members and to abide by the union regulations governing one-time engagements. 2 12 These one-time
engagements, termed "club-dates," were not subject to collective
bargaining agreements, but instead were governed by the regulations incorporated within the union constitution and bylaws. 2 13
The union required orchestra leaders to comply with a minimum
price list when booking club-dates. 21 4 By setting minimum prices
for club-dates, the union ensured that musicians would receive a
2 15
minimum wage for each performance.
The union's "leaders" were responsible for making all arrangements concerning club-date work. These "leaders" met
with customers, scheduled the work, hired musicians, set the fees
and usually conducted the band. 21 6 It was common practice for
most orchestra leaders to work from time to time as musicians for
other orchestra leaders, but when they did club-date work it is
pretty clear that they would be common-law independent
contractors.
The determinative issue in Musicians was whether the orchestra leaders constituted a labor group within the meaning of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. If they did, the "statutory labor exemption" shielded them from antitrust liability for fixing terms of
211. 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
212. Id. at 102-05. With respect to the orchestra leaders, the union pressured them to become union members; insisted upon a closed shop; refused to
bargain collectively; imposed quotas of minimum employment; required them to
use special contracts; required them to agree to all union regulations; favored
local musicians; and charged prices prescribed in a "price list Booklet." Id. at
104-05.
213. Id. at 104.
214. Id. The prices consisted of the minimum wage scales for the instrumentalists, a "leader's fee," which is double the instrumentalists' scale, and an
additional eight percent to cover social security, unemployment insurance and
other expenses. Id.
215. Id. at 107. The Supreme Court agreed with the district court in sustaining the legality of the "price list." Id.
216. Id. at 102-03. The respondents in this case, the orchestra leaders,
must be distinguished from what the union calls a "leader." The union's "leaders" perform most of the booking functions for the instrumentalists. Id.
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their contracts with purchasers of their services. If they did not
constitute a labor group, they were not within the statutory exemption, and their conduct was a per se violation of the Sherman
Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that the orchestra leaders were employers and independent
contractors. 2 17 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court concurred with
the district court and disagreed with the court of appeals, holding
that the orchestra leaders constituted a labor group.2 1 s The
Supreme Court approved the district court's test which looked for
"the presence of a job or wage competition or some other economic interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests be2 19
tween the union members and the independent contractors."
The Court found that there was substantial evidence in the record
below to support the district court's finding that orchestra leaders
functioned in a way which "affected the hours, wages, job security, and working conditions" of union members. 220 Since orchestra leaders were in fact a labor group, their dispute with the union
over membership and work rules was a labor dispute exempted
from antitrust constraints under the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The Court used the "other economic interrelationship"
branch of the Musicians test in H.A. Artists & Associates v. Actors'
Equity Association 22 ' to find that an association of independent
agents representing union actors was a labor group. 22 2 The independent theatrical agents alleged that the union violated the
antitrust laws through this practice of prohibiting union members
from employing agents not licensed by the union. 22 3 In order to
prevent its members from receiving wages below current contract
rates, the union devised a licensing scheme which required agents
to agree to certain conditions governing their relationship with
217. Id. at 105. The Musicians Court stated that it need not decide this
question because it had already been fully considered in both the district court
and the court of appeals. Id. at n.7.
218. Id. at 106. Although the orchestra leaders argued that the union's involvement of the orchestra leaders in the promulgation and enforcement of the
regulations and bylaws created a conspiracy with a "non-labor" group, which
would constitute a violation of the Sherman Act, both the district court and the
court of appeals found that the orchestra leaders formed a "labor" group. Id. at
105.
219. Id. at 106.
220. Id. Therefore, it was lawful for the union to pressure the orchestra
leaders to become union members. Id. at 106-07.
221. 451 U.S. 704 (1981).
222. id. at 704-05.
223. Id. at 710.
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union actors.2 24 The union charged the agents an initial
"franchise fee" and a yearly maintenance fee.2 2 5 The agents were
not parties to the union's contracts with producer-employers.
The Supreme Court identified the threshold issue in this case
as whether the union, in operating the system to license the independent agents, had combined with a nonlabor group to restrict competition within the entertainment field. 2 26 If so, the
union's conduct would not escape antitrust liability under the
22 7
statutory labor exemption.
The Court upheld the decision of the court of appeals, finding that the union had not conspired with producer-employers in
creating and enforcing the licensing system.2 2 8 The Court then
focused on the more difficult issue: whether the participation of
the agents in the licensing system amounted to a combination
2 29
with a nonlabor group.
The Court held that the independent agents were a labor
group, and thus the licensing system fell within the statutory labor exemption of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 230 The Court focused on the agents as the target of the union's conduct and
concluded that in functioning as a "hiring hall" for actors, the
agents affected the wages of union members. 23 ' Since actors
without an agent could not compete on an equal footing with
other actors for jobs, the Court found that it was impossible for
224. Id. at 709.
225. Id. at 710. The agents were also forced to agree to specific regulations
concerning their commissions and to allow clients to terminate a representation
contract if employment was not obtained within a specified period of time. Id. at
709-10.
226. Id. at 717. The H.A. Artists Court found ample support in the record
for the trial court's finding that there was no combination between Equity and
the theatrical producers to create or maintain the franchise system. Id.
227. Id. at 715 (citing Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, IBEW, 325
U.S. 797 (1945)). In Allen Bradley Co., the union's attempt to bar other entities
from entering the labor market would have been exempt from antitrust liability
had the union not acted in conjunction with manufacturers and contractors. Id.
at 715-16.
228. Id. at 717.
229. Id. The Supreme Court cited Musicians in analyzing this difficult issue.
Id. at 717-18 (citing American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99
(1968)).
230. Id. at 722. Because the restrictions challenged by the petitioners in
this case were so similar to those in Musicians, the Court found that the Musicians
formulation necessarily resolved the issue. Id. at 721-22.
231. Id. at 721. The H.A. Artists Court found that agents represented union
members in the sale of their labor, and because in most industries outside of the
entertainment field that function is performed exclusively by unions, the
franchise system functioned as a "hiring hall" for actors. Id.
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the union to enforce the wage provisions of the collective bargaining agreements unless the union could control the practices
23 2
of agents as well.
Both cases illustrate how the legal treatment of the employment relation may turn on the realities of competitive forces in
labor markets. Independent contractors can affect wages and
working conditions of employees in traditional employer-employee relationships even when independent contractors are not
in direct competition with employees for wages.
Deciding whether there is wage competition as in H.A. Artists
and Musicians requires defining markets. Defining markets is important not only for deciding antitrust cases, and potentially important for shaping legal regulation of the employment relation,
but also for defining regulatory jurisdiction in railroad rate regulation. Under the Staggers Rail Act of 1980,233 rail carriers are
exempt from rate regulation unless they have "market dominance." 234 In determining whether market dominance exists, the
Interstate Commerce Commission, under policies in effect from
1980 to the present, considers whether "product competition" or
"geographic competition" provide sufficient competition to cause
a carrier not to be dominant. 23 5 The Interstate Commerce Act
market dominance approach is not directly relevant to defining
the scope of employment regulation. It does, however, illustrate
that market-based determinations can be a threshold for direct
regulation.
VIII.

CANADIAN MODELS

Canadian labor law, like American labor law, protects collective bargaining only by statutory "employees. " 23 6 Before 1965,
Canadian labor law used common-law concepts to distinguish
"employees" from independent contractors. 2 37 In 1965, Professor H.W. Arthurs wrote an influential law review article 2 38 in
232. Id. at 720 n.27 (citation omitted) ("[T]he union cannot eliminate wage
competition among its members without regulation of the fees of the agents.").

233. 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (1982).
234. Id. at § 10701a(a), (b)(1)(2).
235. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 817 F.2d 108, 118
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (considering product competition as relevant factor in market
dominance).
236. Bendel, supra note 99, at 374.

237. Id. at 375-76.
238. Arthurs, The Dependent Contractor: A Study of the Legal Problems of Countervailing Power, 16 U. TORONTo LJ. 89 (1965).
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which he urged a new classification, "dependent contractor," to
include persons such as self-employed truck drivers, peddlers,
taxicab operators and service station lessees. 23 9 He suggested
with statuthat dependent contractors who share a labor market
240
tory employees should be eligible for unionization.
Influential task forces and commissions embraced Arthurs's
idea, 2 4 1 and by the early 1980's, it influenced statutory definitions
of employee in seven Canadian jurisdictions. 24 2 British Columbia2 43 and Newfoundland 24 4 followed the Arthurs recommendation closely.2 4 5 Saskatchewan, 2 4 6 Manitoba, 24 7 the Canadian
federal statute, 248 Nova Scotia 2 49 and Ontario 2 50 deviated considerably from the Arthurs concept, but all extended the employee
of independent
concept to permit at least some classifications
25 1
bargaining.
collective
in
contractors to engage
A Canadian commentator argues that the broadened statutory definitions and the concept of "dependent contractor" are
unnecessary because of the discretion Canadian administrative
agencies have to expand the definition of employee beyond common-law limits to accommodate economic reality.2 5 2 He en239. See id. at 89.
240. Id. at 114.
241. See Bendel, supra note 99, at 375.
242. Id. at 376.
243. Labour Code, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 212, §§ 1, 48 (1979). Section 1
provides:
"Dependent contractor" means a person, whether or not employed by
a contract of employment or furnishing his own tools, vehicles, equipment, machinery, material or any other thing, who performs works or
services for another person for compensation or reward on such terms
and conditions that he is in relation to that person in a position of economic dependence on, and under an obligation to perform duties for,
that person more closely resembling the relationship of an employee
than that of an independent contractor.
Id.
244. Labour Relations Act, NFLD. REV. STAT. ch. 64, §§ 2(l)(k), 40 (1977).
See Bendel, supra note 99, at 376 (characterizing Newfoundland definition as almost identical to British Columbia definition).
245. See Bendel, supra note 99, at 376.
246. Trade Union Act, SASK. STAT. ch. t-17, § 2(f) (1978).
247. Labour Relations Act, MAN. REV. STAT. ch. L-10, § l(i) (1972).
248. Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. ch. L-l, § 107 (1970).
249. Trade Union Act, N.S. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § l(k)(ii) (1972).
250. Labour Relations Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 228, §§ l(l)(h), 6(5)
(1980).
251. See Bendel, supra note 99, at 377 (citing Canadian federal legislation
which labeled owner-operators of trucks and joint-venture fisherman as dependent contractors).
252. Id. at 378-79.
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test," developed by the Canadian

courts, 2 53 which centers on whether the services performed by the

allegedly independent contractor are "integrated" with the activities of the principal. If they are integrated, the putative independent contractor is treated as an employee for collective
254
bargaining purposes.
Another commentator has urged adoption of an "enterprise
control" test which would treat persons who do not run separate
255
enterprises as employees.
These ideas do not necessarily represent appropriate solutions for the United States, but they demonstrate that an AngloAmerican labor system need not be a prisoner of common-law
tort concepts developed to serve policies foreign to the labor
laws.
IX.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMERICAN LABOR LAW

A number of different approaches exist for redefining the
employee concept to include some individual independent contractors. All recognize that it is irrational to use tort-law concepts
to define the boundaries of labor law. "The reasons for blocking
vicarious liability at a particular point have nothing to do with the
2 56
functions of the FLSA."

Conceptually, two approaches exist for revising the definition. One can redefine "employee" more broadly, or one can define "independent contractor" more narrowly. Redefining
"employee" is preferable because it is this term which shapes the
coverage of most of the labor statutes; among the major federal
253. Id. at 381; see Co-operators Ins. Ass'n v. Kearney, 1965 S.C.R. 106,
112 (traditionally marks arrival of "organization test" in Canada); Market Investigations, Ltd. v. Minister of Social Security, [1962] 2 Q.B. 173, 184, 3 All E.R.
732, 737 (1968) (asking "[i]s the person who has engaged himself to perform
these services performing them as a person in business on his own account?");
Stevenson Jordan & Harrison, Ltd. v. MacDonald & Evans, 1 T.L.R. 101, 111
(1952) (explaining organization test as work situation in which employee is integral part of business and not just accessory to it).
254. Bendel, supra note 99, at 381-82.
255. See Flannigan, Enterprise Control. The Servant-Independent ContractorDistinction, 37 U. ToRoNro L.J. 25, 61 n.85 (1987) (endorsing utility of enterprise
control test developed primarily in context of vicarious liability for employment
law purposes).
256. See Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1544 (7th Cir.
1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (criticizing common-law tests), petitionfor cert.
filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3806 (U.S. May 9, 1988) (No. 87-1853). For a discussion of
Judge Easterbrook's concurrence, see supra notes 17-21, 26 and accompanying
text.
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Alternative Approaches

One approach would be to exempt from the statutory employee definition only those independent contractors having employees of their own. This could be achieved by adding the
italicized portion below to the NLRA definition of employee.
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and
shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise,
and shall include any individual whose work has ceased
as a consequence of or, in connection with, any current
labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and
who has not obtained any other regular and substantially
equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or
any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any
individual having the status of an independent contractor [with employees of his own,] or any individual employed
as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended
from time to time, or by any other person who is not an
2 57
employer as herein defined.
This approach has the virtue of simplicity. It would, however, almost certainly be overinclusive, encompassing within the
definition of employee individual independent contractors who
provide their own capital equipment, work on their own premises
and take significant entrepreneurial risk.
Another approach is to authorize an administrative agency
like the National Labor Relations Board to define employee more
broadly, vesting in the Board discretion similar to that which existed before the 1947 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act. 2 58 This could be effected by deleting the italicized
words from the definition below:
257. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982) (italicized portion added by author). Adding the italicized portion, "with employees of his own," to section 152(3) of the
NLRA would serve to narrow the number of independent contractors presently
exempt from the statutory definition of employee.
258. For a discussion of the discretion exercised by the NLRB prior to the
1947 amendments to the NLRA, see supra notes 107-17 and accompanying text.
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The term "employee" shall include any employee,
and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has
ceased as a consequence of or, in connection with, any
current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice, and who has not obtained any other regular
and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not
include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person
at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or
spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent
contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or
any individual employed by an employer subject to the
Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or by
any other person who is not an employer as herein
25 9
defined.
This approach permits flexibility and consideration of diverse
circumstances in different industries and workplaces. However, it
only directly addresses the question of employee definition under
one statute. Nevertheless, courts interpreting "employee" under
other statutes could be guided by NLRA precedent much as they

are now.
Another approach is to borrow something like the "enterprise control" test from Canada. 2 60 This approach has superficial
appeal, but is not significantly different from the test presently
used by American courts. It basically would emphasize one of the
factors presently considered by American courts 26 1 and diminish
consideration given to other factors.
Still another approach would be to borrow the Canadian bargaining power formula. 26 2 Such an approach could read as
follows:
Persons who lack significant bargaining power as individuals in dealing with the purchaser of their services shall
259. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982) (emphasis added to indicate proposed

deletion).
260. For a discussion of the enterprise control test, see supra note 255 and
accompanying text.
261. For a discussion of the factors considered by American courts under
the right-to-control test, see supra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
262. For a discussion of the Canadian "organization test"/bargaining
power formula, see supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
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be employees for purposes of this Act. Bargaining
power shall be assessed considering all material factors,
specifically including consideration of whether the individual performs services for more than one person.
This approach is difficult to distinguish from the "economic
dependency" factor that dominates the definitional inquiry under
the Fair Labor Standards Act. 263 This is probably the least appealing approach because it would make statutory definitions turn
on the relative power between service providers and service purchasers, a balance which changes with market conditions 2 6 and
which basically is inconsistent with the American approach to collective bargaining of allowing bargaining strength to affect private
workplace governance decisions. 265 Moreover, this approach
sweeps too broadly because almost any economic actor can be
characterized as dependent to some degree on other economic
266

actors.
Judge Easterbrook has suggested yet another approach,
which apparently would turn on whether the seller of services
provides appreciable human or physical capital. 2 67 The Easterbrook approach is somewhat unclear and suffers from the disadvantage that many skilled persons who indisputably are
employees under current law provide significant human capital.
It would be difficult to say, for example, that a machinist with
twenty years seniority, working in a factory environment, does not
provide significant human capital.
Finally, the core of the approach recommended by Professor
Arthurs in Canada 2 68 and used by American courts in defining the
boundaries of the statutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws
could be used. Under this approach, the definition of employee
263. Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1538 (7th Cir. 1987),
petitionfor cert.filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3806 (U.S. May 9, 1988) (No. 87-1853).
264. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 269 n.25 (10th Cir.) (likening
economic reality test to test of relative bargaining power), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
503 (1987); Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1539-45 (Easterbrook,J., concurring) (criticizing economic reality test as producing unpredictable results).
265. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490-91 (1960)
("The use of economic pressure ...

is of itself not at all inconsistent with the

duty of bargaining in good faith.").
266. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1541-42 (Easterbrook,J., concurring).
267. Id. at 1543-45 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). For a discussion of the
approach suggested by Judge Easterbrook, see supra notes 17-21, 26 and accompanying text.
268. For a discussion of Professor Arthurs's approach, see supra notes 23851 and accompanying text.
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would encompass anyone who competes in the same labor market
as employees, specifically exempting independent contractors
that have employees of their own. An example of such an approach could read:
A person is an employee for purposes of this Act if the
person competes in the same labor market as employees.
A person competes in the same labor market if he or she
is engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation as persons treated as employees, and if purchasers
of services from the person can obtain the same services
from persons employed by the purchaser without significant additional capital investment or organizational
change.
Although argument persists with respect to market boundary
definitions, defining relevant markets is a task familiar to courts
and advocates in the context of antitrust litigation. Judge Easterbrook has suggested replacing current tests with a standard which
would look at whether workers supply more than their own labor,
such as physical or human capital. 26 9 The labor market approach
would reach essentially the same result as the Easterbrook test.
The labor market approach also overlaps to a considerable degree with an inquiry into industry practice, used by courts in ap2 70
plying both the NLRA and FLSA definitions.
Such a labor market competition definition would well meet
the needs of both the collective bargaining statutes 2 7' and the
Fair Labor Standards Act. It would not necessarily meet the policies of the Occupational Safety and Health Act or the antidiscrimination statutes. It is too broad for occupational health and
2 72
safety regulation; it is too narrow for discrimination regulation.
If, as is suggested in this article, the concept of "employee"
should be defined with reference to the policies of labor and employment law rather than with respect to tort liability concepts, it
is not at all clear that the definition should be the same under the
various regimes of employment regulation. The collective bar269. See Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1543-45 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
270. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968); Local 777,
Democratic Union Org. Comm., Seafarers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862,
872-73 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
271. See generally Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283,
289 (1959) (accepting union justification for regulating payments to independent truck drivers and noting potential to undercut employee wages).
272. See supra text accompanying notes 199-202 and 186-87.
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gaining statutes are mainly concerned with permitting service
providers, who compete with each other but who are dependent
on purchasers of their services, to band together to increase their
bargaining power. The minimum wage statutes are concerned
with eliminating competition from service providers paid less
than a fair wage. The core issue under both types of statutes is
competition among the providers of service. Under these statutes, therefore, it is intuitively appropriate to define coverage, via
the definition of employee, by focusing on the scope of competition in the labor market.
The health and safety statutes are not concerned mainly with
labor market competition. Rather, they are concerned with the
practical ability of a purchaser of services to influence safety and
health conditions for the providers of the services, and, at least
peripherally, with the degree of dependence of the providers on
the purchasers. Accordingly, it makes little sense to define the
scope of health and safety statutory coverage based on labor market competition concepts. It makes more sense for this definition
to focus on the degree of control the potential "employer" has
over the workplace conditions of the providers of services. The
Occupational Safety and Health Act definition should be rewritten to include any person who works on premises provided by the
purchaser of services.
The antidiscrimination statutes have no particular concern
with labor market competitive forces. Nor is there any apparent
reason why they are concerned with control over workplace conditions. Rather, the central policy reflected by Title VII, along
with the other titles of the civil rights acts, and the reconstruction
era civil rights acts, is that persons ought not to discriminate in
their economic relations based upon certain prohibited characteristics. Accordingly, there is no reason why the coverage of Title
VII should not be extended broadly to include a large spectrum
of independent contractor relations, even if the resulting redefinition of Title VII coverage includes many independent contractors
who ought to be excluded from NLRA or safety and health regulation. Indeed, such relations already are addressed by section
1981 of title 42, which in express terms prohibits discrimination
in the making of contracts.2 73 The antidiscrimination statutes
should define employee so as to include any independent contractor that does not have employees of its own.
273. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
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Defining the Relevant Labor Market

If a labor-market-competition standard is to be used, it is
necessary to apply analytic criteria for defining the relevant market. The first step is easier than the others; excluding independent contractors who have employees of their own. This exclusion
is appropriate to ensure that the revised approach to distinguishing "employees" from independent entrepreneurs does not include employers within the definition of "employee," a kind of
circularity in legal relations that is undesirable.
After applying the initial exclusion, antitrust law is a helpful
guide. Product differentiation and barriers to entry are the most
appropriate considerations.
A court confronted with the question of whether a purported
independent contractor should be treated as an "employee"
should consider the services market from the vantage point of the
purchaser of services, and consider the extent to which the purported independent contractor faces competition from potential
employees. In other words, the question is: To what extent does
a potential employee offer services that are an acceptable substi274
tute for the services of the purported independent contractor?
This part of the analysis focuses on whether the purported independent contractor provides anything to the purchaser that
employees would not provide. A taxicab operator, for example,
might provide his own cash receipts management and banking,
which an employee driver would not provide. If the services are
exactly the same, then there is no basis for product differentiation, and it can be concluded that the purported independent
contractor and employees compete in exactly the same market.
Even if a degree of product differentiation exists, it still is
appropriate to consider barriers to entry. How easy is it for an
employee to become an independent contractor? If the independent contractor provides significant capital equipment of
his own, barriers to entry exist. If the independent contractor
provides no capital equipment, nor significant educational or
other intellectual capital, no barriers to entry exist and independ274. Compare United States v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,
395 (1956) (finding that flexible packaging materials, not cellophane itself, constitutes relevant market for Sherman Act section 2 monopolization case) with
United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1966) (central station
alarm services is relevant market, separate from watchman services, but burglar
and fire alarm central station services are not separate markets) and International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 249-52 (1959) (championship
boxing separate market from professional boxing events).
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ent contractors and employees are essentially fungible in the labor market.
Though product differentiation and entry-based concepts
borrowed from antitrust law are helpful concepts, they must be
transplanted to employment law analysis with sensitivity to the
different policies served by antitrust and labor law. Antitrust law
seeks to increase competition. Labor law seeks to decrease it.
For example, a finding of product differentiation in antitrust suggests less competition and, therefore, more legal scrutiny. A finding of "product differentiation" in a labor market, under the
proposed approach would suggest less competition and, therefore, less need for legal involvement.
X.

CONCLUSION

The boundary between employees and independent contractors defines the scope of labor and employment law. In recent
years, too little attention has been given to whether the boundary
as presently defined bears a rational relationship to national labor
and employment policies. Statutory employee should be redefined to fit the policies of labor and employment statutes rather
than reflecting historical tort liability policies. This article does
not purport to provide a final practical solution, but only to stimulate a dialogue and identify some of the basic conceptual
alternatives.
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